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‘Administrative Justice in an Interconnected World’ is a compelling and elusive topic. Is my goal
to discuss the extent to which administrative justice is in fact in an interconnected world or what
it would take for this claim to become a reality. The claim that administrative justice is
interconnected in this way is the compelling part – in other words, that the many disparate
statutory tribunals, boards, agencies, commissions, etc, across the common law world, which
exist in a decision-making sphere apart from both courts and government departments, and
operate within different legal, political and policy cultures, share enough common ground to
constitute a distinct system of justice. The reality is the elusive part – while there are hints at
how such interconnected developments might proceed, there are also wholly parallel
discussions where administrative law appears to be developing in splendid isolation in each
jurisdiction, where legal and policy problems are approached as if no one else had ever
considered them, and where occasionally different countries with similar values arrive at
disparate responses to the same dilemmas.
While the ambition of administrative justice in an interconnected world is daunting, there is a
recurring, intuitive resonance to this proposition. One brief anecdote captures this intuition.
Some years back, I was involved in a research initiative commissioned by the Canadian Judicial
Council (CJC) on the subject of the models of court administration. While Canada’s judiciary has
a deserved reputation for excellence, independence and integrity, Canada’s courts are
managed by executive departments within ministries of justice or offices of Attorneys General.
While this created the appearance of conflicts from time to time, given the frequency with which
those same government departments appeared before courts, this duality of role was inevitable,
so the argument went, because of the inherent constraints of ministerial democracy in a
Parliamentary system. Part of our research, of course, involved looking at the state of affairs in
other Parliamentary democracies and Australia in particular had a number of courts run on
models of judicial autonomy. This ultimately became the recommended model of the CJC,
highlighting the Australian experience as a counterpoint to the argument that judicial autonomy
was incompatible with ministerial responsibility. Ironically, or perhaps revealingly, when I
travelled to Australia to learn the origins of the judicial autonomy model there, many pointed to
the inspiration provided by a Report commissioned by the CJC by a Quebec Judge, Jules
Deschenes, entitled Masters in Their Own House/Maitres chez eux 1 – which had found its way
to reform minded judges and politicians in Australia. This story, in microcosm, is the porousness
I believe informs and enriches the story of the common law in countries like Canada and
Australia. Ideas flow in, they flow out, and the sum may well be more than an agglomeration of
the parts.
Adjudication in the public interest is an animating principle of administrative justice in all
common law jurisdictions. The question is what is particular to a jurisdiction, or a territory, or a
cultural and historical perspective? Australia and Canada, for example, both are settler societies
with strong indigenous communities where reconciliation and restorative justice are strong
themes. Canada, however, also has a strong internal divide that is linguistically and culturally
based between French and English Canada which has given rise to a robust form of federalism,

bilingualism, and bijuralism in law between common law and civil law traditions. Australia, by
contrast, lacks this dynamic, but has been shaped by a stronger republican streak than in
Canada. Each is predominantly urban and multicultural but whose cultural soul may well reside
in the fortitude of a small number of rural and agricultural pioneers overcoming the odds and the
elements to build a society. Both countries remain part of the Commonwealth and the
Constitutional culture of each was born of an evolution toward federating British colonies, rather
than revolutions to assert individual rights or nationalist fervour.
Applying the principles and doctrines of administrative law, and reconciling the intent of
legislatures with the lived experience of those seeking justice from these adjudicative bodies,
represent broadly shared challenges for administrative justice. This claim also speaks to the
very real possibility that developments in one part of the common law world have implications
for the other parts. I will attempt to identify the interconnected strands of administrative justice,
which will be examined with reference to three areas:
(1) First, I will discuss the foundational issue of the boundaries of administrative law and
administrative justice;
(2) Second, I will discuss the interconnectedness of jurisprudence, and will highlight the
relationship between Australian and Canadian courts’ approaches to the legal standards
of fairness; and
(3) Third, I will discuss the interconnectedness of administrative justice through the
example of the form and structure of Agencies, Boards and Tribunals, particularly with
respect to the wave of accountability concerns sweeping the common law world.
Interconnected questions about administrative law and justice?
What is administrative law? This should not be as vexing a question as it is. At its core,
administrative law provides a framework of accountability for the exercise of executive authority.
When considering the judicial review of a statutory decision-maker on grounds the decision was
unreasonable or unfair, the question is indeed relatively straight-forward. However, that is where
the easy part ends. Here are just a few of the absolutely fundamental questions about the scope
of administrative law with which courts both in Australia and Canada have wrestled:
(a) Are administrative tribunals and adjudicative bodies part of the executive or judicial
branch of government?
(b) Are there circumstances where a private entity (for example, a company involved in a
joint venture with a government agency) is subject to administrative law?
(c) Are any government decisions immune from review on administrative law grounds?
By considering the experience of different common law jurisdictions, it is possible to discern
some universal and some particular dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly, the very foundation of the
field turns out to be one of the most mutable and changeable issues.
What is administrative justice?
While the United Kingdom approaches administrative tribunals as a division of the judicial
branch of government, both Australia and Canada wrestle with this question. In Canada,
tribunals have been held to be part of the executive branch of government, but separated from

the ‘political executive’ by a number of common law and in some cases constitutional autonomy
protections. In Australia, tribunals appear as neither fish nor fowl, which is what has led some of
Australia’s leading administrative law thinkers to suggest a fourth branch of government may be
necessary to adequately capture the distinctiveness of administrative justice. 2 Indeed, I have
advanced the same argument in the Canadian context. 3
The scope of administrative justice itself used to be relatively straightforward, flowing from the
inherently public nature of a decision-maker authorized to make decisions by statute. However,
in the era of public/private partnerships, and public authorities turning to or delegating private
providers to deliver publicly funded services (particularly in settings of health care and social
benefits but extending to utilities as well as transportation and energy infrastructure).
Administrative justice now clearly can extend to private settings.
By contrast, in Canada at least, purely public settings, such as employment relationships
between a government agency and public servants, are becoming ‘privatized’ with respect to
legal accountability, as contractual provisions take precedence over doctrines such as
procedural fairness. These dual and related trends lead to a blurring of the boundaries of
administrative law. Similarly, parties frustrated by the limited remedies and circuitous pathways
of administrative justice have turned with growing creativity to the courts – in Canada, for
example, bringing class actions on behalf of all taxpayers against a minister for a breach of
fiduciary obligations where the minister took a step which appeared to benefit a small group of
investors at the expense of the public purse. 4
What lies beyond administrative justice?
Should any kinds of public authority lie beyond administrative justice? Justiciability represents
one of those universal concepts which each jurisdiction, at least in the common law world,
invents for itself. While its periphery can extend to ripeness,mootness and standing, its core
relates to two related propositions – first, that some kinds of disputes because of their subject
matter are not amenable to judicial determination; and second, that some kinds of disputes,
even if amenable to judicial determination, have been assigned to some other form of dispute
resolution (for example, disputes over conduct of Parliamentarians has been assigned to the
Speaker of the House of Commons rather than the Courts).
Both Australia and Canada can trace their justiciability doctrines relating to prerogative powers
as a response to the UK House of Lords 1985 decision in Council of Civil Service Unions. 5 The
case concerned whether consultation was required in relation to the then British PM’s decision
to prevent unionization of a branch of the security services. The majority of the House of Lords
disagreed with the proposition that prerogative powers should remain beyond review. In
Canada, while allowing for review of executive authority sourced to prerogative powers
generally, a number of areas of such powers have been held non-justiciable on the grounds
they are not amenable for judicial determination, including disputes about the conferral of
honours in Black 6 (deciding whether a Canadian citizen should be made a Lord in the UK) and
the exercise of foreign relations in Turp 7 (deciding whether to send troops to Iraq). Australia
adopted a similar response in Peko, 8 where the Australian Federal Court rejected automatic
immunity but found a decision relating to declaring part of a park as a heritage site to lie beyond
the province of justiciability.

On the other hand, questions around the core of fairness, bias and independence appear
universal. Every common law jurisdiction has struck a remarkably similar balance in this regard
but the balance may look quite different, as discussed below.
Interconnected jurisprudence
Why have Australian Courts embraced the doctrine of legitimate expectations while Canadian
Courts have rejected it and instead focused on the interstices of reasonableness and the
obligation to provide reasons? Why does rulemaking dominate the administrative law
conversation in the US and Europe but not in Australia or Canada, where arguably constraints
on executive discretion and standards of review have loomed larger? Asking such questions, in
my view, is precisely why approaching administrative justice as interconnectedness is
worthwhile. While the discussion below might relate to Canada and Australia, it is a
conversation to which every legal jurisdiction will have an important voice to add.
In 1995, the Australian High Court issued its well-known decision in Minister of State for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh. 9 The case concerned Ah Hin Teoh, a Malaysian citizen,
who was ordered to be deported after a drug conviction notwithstanding that he and his wife had
Australian born children. The majority of the High Court (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and
Gaudron JJ) agreed with the Federal Court decision that there had been a breach of natural
justice as the Immigration department had failed to invite Mr Teoh to make a submission on
whether a deportation order should be made, contrary to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, which provided that in any administrative decision concerning a child, the child's best
interests must be a primary consideration. The majority of the Court held that the ratification of
an international convention can be a basis for the existence of a legitimate expectation and that,
in this instance, there had been a want of procedural fairness.
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada synthesized and extended a number of administrative
law doctrines in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 10 a case dealing with
many of the same themes and issues as Teoh. Again, the case arose out of a request to stave
off deportation of Mavis Baker, a Jamaican born woman in Canada illegally where she had
Canadian born children. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized a duty to provide reasons
for the first time in Baker, although the case was decided in Baker’s favour because of a breach
of fairness based on a reasonable apprehension of bias. The decision of the immigration
authorities denying Ms Baker an exemption from the then Immigration Act on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds was also quashed on the grounds it was an unreasonable exercise of
discretion.
Both Teoh and Baker, decided within a few years of each other, reflected moments of renewed
judicial activism in the constraint of executive discretion, and each built on earlier English
jurisprudence exploring the principle of legitimate expectations in administrative law. Each has
given rise to ripples which washed up on the other jurisdiction’s shores, as a number of
Australian cases have considered Baker just as a number of Canadian courts have explored the
implications of Teoh. Indeed, it is not too far a stretch to conclude through consideration of
these cases, that the Australian and Canadian courts together have worked out the dominant
common law approach to legitimate expectations.
Baker reached the Federal Court within months of Teoh being released. Justice Strayer who
wrote the judgment in Baker on behalf of the Federal Court of Appeal, discussed Teoh at length.
He concluded:

I therefore respectfully reject the reasoning of the majority in the Teoh case and, as did the Motions
Judge, adopt the reasoning of McHugh J. The majority judgments in Teoh have been criticized by
at least one author. Furthermore, the finding by the Court that Australia's ratification of the
Convention amounted to a public undertaking by the government that the Convention would be
applied in Australia, thus giving rise to legitimate expectations, was specifically repudiated by that
11
government.

When Baker reached the Supreme Court in Canada, Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, without
mentioning Teoh by name, addressed the issue in the following terms:
I turn now to an application of these principles to the circumstances of this case to determine
whether the procedures followed respected the duty of procedural fairness. I will first determine
whether the duty of procedural fairness that would otherwise be applicable is affected, as the
appellant argues, by the existence of a legitimate expectation based upon the text of the articles of
the Convention and the fact that Canada has ratified it. In my view, however, the articles of the
Convention and their wording did not give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of Ms Baker
that when the decision on her H & C application was made, specific procedural rights above what
would normally be required under the duty of fairness would be accorded, a positive finding would
be made, or particular criteria would be applied. This Convention is not, in my view, the equivalent
of a government representation about how H & C applications will be decided, nor does it suggest
that any rights beyond the participatory rights discussed below will be accorded. Therefore, in this
case there is no legitimate expectation affecting the content of the duty of fairness, and the fourth
factor outlined above therefore does not affect the analysis. It is unnecessary to decide whether an
international instrument ratified by Canada could, in other circumstances, give rise to a legitimate
12
expectation.

When the issue next reached the Australian High Court in Re Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam, 13 the Court specifically considered the approach to the issue
which the Supreme Court of Canada had taken in Baker. The case concerned a father with
temporary status in Australia once again being separated from his children due to a criminal
conviction. The Court addressed Baker in the context of whether legitimate expectations could
give rise to substantive as well as procedural remedies:
79. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has stopped short of giving the doctrine of legitimate
expectation a substantive operation. Indeed, in Baker v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, in a
judgment with which four other members of the Supreme Court agreed, L'Heureux-Dubé J said:
‘[T]he doctrine of legitimate expectations cannot lead to substantive rights outside the procedural
domain. This doctrine, as applied in Canada, is based on the principle that the 'circumstances'
affecting procedural fairness take into account the promises or regular practices of administrative
decision-makers, and that it will generally be unfair for them to act in contravention of
representations as to procedure, or to backtrack on substantive promises without according
significant procedural rights.’
80. The subject was further considered by McLachlin CJ and Binnie J in their judgment in Mount Sinai
Hospital Center v Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services). Binnie J (who delivered the
judgment) discussed Coughlan and continued: ‘It thus appears that the English doctrine of
legitimate expectation has developed into a comprehensive code that embraces the full gamut of
administrative relief from procedural fairness at the low end through “enhanced” procedural fairness
based on conduct, thence onwards to estoppel (though it is not to be called that) including
substantive relief at the high end, ie the end representing the greatest intrusion by the courts into
public administration. The intrusion is said to be justified by the multiplicity of conflicting decisions
by a public authority on the same point directed to the same individual(s)’. With the reasoning then
developed by Binnie J in the succeeding passages, we would respectfully agree. He writes: ‘In
ranging over such a vast territory under the banner of “fairness”, it is inevitable that subclassifications must be made to differentiate the situations which warrant highly intrusive relief from
those which do not. Many of the English cases on legitimate expectations relied on by the
respondents, at the low end, would fit comfortably within our principles of procedural fairness. At
the high end they represent a level of judicial intervention in government policy that our courts, to
date, have considered inappropriate in the absence of a successful challenge under the Canadian

Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There is, on the one hand, a concern that treating procedural
fairness as a subset of legitimate expectations may unnecessarily complicate and indeed inhibit
rather than encourage the development of the highly flexible rules of procedural fairness. On the
other hand, there is a countervailing concern that using a Minister's prior conduct against him as a
launching pad for substantive relief may strike the wrong balance between private and public
interests, and blur the role of the court with the role of the Minister.’

Legitimate expectation continues to serve both as a norm of natural justice and as an
instantiation of the separation of powers. The result of this interconnected jurisprudence is that
the executive branch should be held by the courts to take its promises seriously, but only to the
extent that the remedy is fairness. International commitments by the executive matter under this
approach, but cannot usurp the role of the legislature in incorporating such commitments into
domestic law. Canadian and Australian courts may well have come to this conclusion without
reference to the other’s judgments, but arguably the analysis of each was enriched by its
engagement with the other.
Interconnected structures and standards of administrative justice
The interconnectedness of administrative law both leads to and is reinforced by the
interconnectedness of administrative justice. How are these concepts distinct? Administrative
law typically relates to the doctrines which govern administrative decision-making, such as
legitimate expectations, discussed above. Administrative justice, by contrast, typically relates to
the decision-making structures, whether regulators, tribunals, boards, agencies or ministry
departments, and to the lived experience of those who appear before them.
Unlike some of the universal questions addressed above such as ‘what is administrative
justice?’ or ‘what is fairness?’, the structures of administrative justice are guided by more
shifting and particular considerations, such as policy, budgets, patronage and politics. Here too,
though, there are interconnecting developments worthy of note. Both Australia and Canada
have been witnessing an unprecedented period of experimentation, innovation and change in
administrative justice. As in the administrative law context, developments in administrative
justice in each jurisdiction have had an interesting and important impact on one another.
The goal of modernizing administrative tribunal systems is ultimately to improve the
effectiveness, efficiency, and accessibility of administrative justice – a goal shared across most
common law systems. As the costs associated with traditional court-centred legal processes
have grown, so has the popularity and variety of administrative tribunals in the view of both
policy makers and various user communities. Individuals are looking to these tribunals as
simpler and more economical avenues to review administrative decision making and to resolve
their disputes, free from the many formal trappings of the law courts – a trend which is likely to
continue as the cost of access grows as a concern, not only for socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals but also for the politically significant middle class. Similarly, as social
and economic disputes become more complex, specialty courts staffed with expert adjudicators
often will be more effective than generalist judges.
Unfortunately, even while individual administrative tribunals are promoted as simpler, more
efficient and more expert in particular subject matters than courts, fragmentation within tribunal
systems continues to thwart these basic dimensions of access for users in several ways.
Consider the low-income individual in Ontario who faces a challenge in obtaining social benefits
and is in a dispute with her landlord. That individual needs to navigate both the Social Benefits
Tribunal and the Landlord Tenant Board’s procedures and rules. These two tribunals may

operate in separate buildings and use different forms. They may employ different styles of
adjudication and they may have divergent or even clashing organizational cultures. As a result,
the user is forced to navigate a set of institutional silos which impose high financial and
informational costs and are likely to impede the overall quality of justice services that the
tribunals can offer.
The New Zealand Law Commission has reported a ‘lack of overall coherence’ in many tribunal
systems, making individual tribunals increasingly difficult for users to understand and navigate
as interrelated institutions, and vulnerable to claims that they fail to deliver administrative justice
in cost-effective ways. 14 That conclusion echoes earlier comments by Sir Andrew Leggatt in his
review of the UK’s tribunals:
[m]ost tribunals [in the UK] are entirely self-contained, and operate separately from each other,
using different practices and standards. It is obvious that the term 'tribunal system' is a misnomer...
15
each tribunal has evolved as a solution to a particular problem, adapted to one particular area.

One obvious outcome of this fragmented landscape is that the sheer number of administrative
tribunals – each with their own physical and logistical infrastructure – represents a considerable
duplication of resources and prevents smaller tribunals from achieving economies of scale. In a
survey preceding its report on tribunal reform, the New Zealand Law Commission counted over
100 specialist tribunals and courts in that country alone, while Leggatt considered 70 different
tribunal bodies within the scope of his review. Despite opportunities for some tribunals to share
their resources many remain operating in isolation, probably in part because each tribunal is or
perceives itself to be limited by its enabling legislation and by the associated mandates of a
particular government ministry. Likewise, individual tribunals are each responsible for designing
and implementing their own practices and procedures, making it difficult for users of more than
one tribunal to access knowledge and to operate between them. This can be particularly
frustrating for users when a single dispute concerns more than one tribunal – for example,
where land use, planning and environmental regulatory issues coincide.
Fragmentation arguably hinders first-instance decision-makers from learning more effectively
from the decisions of review tribunals. A more coherent system would improve the quality of
first-instance decisions by facilitating better feedback processes from tribunal adjudication,
allowing judgments from all related tribunals to inform administrative decision making in the
future. Certainly, some authors have questioned whether appeal decisions issued by tribunals
have traditionally had much effect on the quality of first-instance decision making. Addressing
the problems associated with fragmentation in the tribunal system may be one response to this
disconnect. Over time, a system that fosters better first-instance decisions will tend to rely less
on appeals or judicial review, enhancing access to justice by lowering costs and the time
required to achieve a just outcome. Moreover, fragmentation in determining legal rights is likely
to make it more difficult for tribunals to maintain decision-making independence from their
respective ministries. A system of atomized tribunal bodies operating in relative isolation likely
creates more opportunities for departmental capture and makes it difficult to impose and
regulate the shared principles of transparency and openness that can flow from greater
independence.
System-wide reform efforts in these countries have attempted to address the various aspects of
fragmentation that plague modern administrative states. The earliest of these initiatives was to
establish the federal Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in Australia in 1976, following a
report by the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee chaired by Sir John Kerr. At that
time, the Kerr Committee sketched a picture of an administrative justice system that was

uncoordinated, contained many gaps, and was not easily understood by its constituents. The
ultimate product of the Committee's report, the Administrative Tribunals Act, created a generalist
tribunal to review administrative decisions, which today has jurisdiction to conduct merits review
under a wide variety of more than 400 Acts of the federal Parliament.
While a small number of specialist federal tribunals still exist in Australia, the outcome of the
AAT model has been to centralize merits review of first-instance decisions within a single
organization that includes a membership of appointed judges, lawyers, and experts in various
fields such as medical practitioners, engineers and planners. This ‘super tribunal’ model has
been replicated at the State level in Australia, although these tribunals have taken on a variety
of different forms in practice. The jurisdiction of the Victoria Civil and Administrative Tribunal
(VCAT), for example, extends beyond merits review into human rights and some civil claims.
Western Australia's State Administrative Tribunal was not established until 2004 but loosely
tracks the structure of the VCAT. Jurisdiction over merits review and dispute settlement in New
South Wales remains more fragmented compared to Victoria and Western Australia, although
the State’s Administrative Decisions Tribunal (ADT), established in 1997, was designed to act in
part as an amalgamated generalist review body.
In practice, Peter Cane observes that the new organization of tribunal adjudication in the UK
most closely reflects the two-tiered model proposed by Australia’s Administrative Research
Council in the mid-1990s but later abandoned by the Australian government. 16 The outcome for
the UK, Crane argues, is a system not unlike that of conventional law courts. Australia – at least
at the federal level – has so far resisted this trajectory in favour of a model that sees
amalgamated tribunal agencies as a ‘distinct genus of adjudicatory institution’ that seek to
maintain their pragmatic advantages in terms of speed, affordability and informality.
At root, each of these responses can be understood as attempts to re-imagine individual
tribunals as part of a coherent and continuous system of administrative justice. That perspective
took longer to catch hold in Canada. According to Heather McNaughton, ‘[i]t was not until
recently that governments and Canadian courts have started to conceptualize administrative
tribunals dealing with such disparate interests as the protection of fundamental human rights,
the issuance and transfer of quota for production of agricultural products, and property tax
assessment, as being part of a system of justice.’ 17 Michael Adler has labeled this an
‘administrative justice approach’ which recognizes the important role of courts, tribunals,
ombudsmen and other external redress mechanisms but also emphasizes internal means of
enhancing administrative decisions such as recruitment, training and appraisal processes, as
well as standard setting and quality assurance systems. 18
A countervailing consideration to whole system reform is that administrative tribunals must
retain a degree of flexibility in order to accommodate and support their particular mandates and
areas of expertise. McNaughton cautions that ‘[t]he temptation to one size fits all reforms fails to
take into account the fact that the specialist areas delegated to administrative tribunals form the
very basis for their existence in the first place.’ The main challenge of tribunal reform might thus
be seen as an attempt to modernize and rationalize administrative tribunal systems while
respecting, maintaining and promoting core principles of accessibility, pragmatism, and
expediency. In other words, the key is to make the system coherent while keeping it ‘nimble’.
In 2009, Ontario adopted the Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and
Appointments Act (ATAAGA) which established a mechanism for creating Tribunal clusters. 19
Clusters bring together distinct tribunals which share a subject area theme, and allow those

tribunals to harness shared services, standards and locales as well as cross-appointments and
joint training. Using that legislation, the Ontario Government has created two clusters thus far –
the Environmental & Land Tribunal of Ontario (ELTO), which is made up of four separate
tribunals, and the Social Justice Tribunal of Ontario (SJTO), which has seven distinct tribunals.
The clustering concept drew express inspiration from the Australian context, just as the
proposed New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT), which seeks to
consolidate a wide range of tribunals but preserve their distinct areas of expertise seems to be a
potential alternative to clustering (the NCAT is set to launch in 2014 with five specialty divisions
- Consumer, Administrative and Equal Opportunity, Occupational and Regulatory, Guardianship,
and Victims).
Just as clusters and super-tribunals have arisen as a structure for administrative justice, new
legislation in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada has focused on the accountability of
administrative justice. ATAAGA has for the first time required all tribunals to have codes of
conduct addressing conflicts of interest and publicly available business plans, and memoranda
of understanding with the government outlining roles and responsibilities of the Government and
quasi-independent adjudicative bodies. More so than the specific changes to which this
legislation may lead, the creation of coherent templates for this accountability contributes to the
reality of an administrative justice system rather than a disparate and uncoordinated set of
agencies, boards and tribunals.
Accountability also has been a driver of administrative justice in Australia. For example,
COAT’s 2012 ‘Framework of Excellence’ seeks to provide an evidence based approach to the
evaluation of tribunal performance (which builds on a 2008 Framework of Excellence applicable
to courts). 20 The Framework focuses on the core values of tribunals, the areas of excellence
and the criteria for measuring excellence. Last summer, I received an email from the Chair of
the SJTO cluster asking if I had come across the Framework and how it might speak to the
Canadian experience with administrative justice. In the case of administrative justice, it is not
just judges who have been creating the interconnectedness of administrative law jurisprudence,
but tribunal members themselves. While the optimal structure of a tribunal may not be a
universal question, how to measure the success of an administrative or adjudicative decision is.
Should success be determined based on the satisfaction of the parties, the degree of public
confidence which a decision-making body enjoys or other quantitative measures (volume of
caseload, cost, delay, etc)?
The Framework of Excellence may not be a universally applicable standard, but it has sparked
meaningful debate in many jurisdictions about the goals of administrative justice and the
appropriate forms of accountability to which administrative decision-makers should be subject.
Interconnectedness, in this sense, is not about one development in a jurisdiction affecting other
jurisdictions but rather about a shared conversation.
Conclusion
This brings me to the conclusion of this brief analysis. I hope I have illustrated both the ways in
which the interconnectedness of administrative justice is a claim and a reality. I would suggest,
in light of the above discussion, that interconnectedness in administrative law flows from three
key conditions:

(1) first, the presence of a question that is widely applicable to diverse
jurisdictions, such as the scope of fairness, or the separation of powers
between executive, legislative and judicial action.;
(2) second, the presence of particular answers in distinct jurisdictions which differ
sufficiently
to
require
an
explanation,
such
as
the
legitimate
expectations/reasonableness divergence arising out of Teoh and Baker; and
(3) third, a venue or venues for shared conversations about administrative justice, such
as the connections, blog posts and conference chats that led to the ‘Framework of
Excellence’ migrating from Australia to Canada last summer.
Where these three conditions are present, as in the areas explored above, administrative justice
operates on two levels simultaneously – both as a body of doctrines and principles within a
particular jurisdiction and as a body of doctrines and principles developing across jurisdictions.
The nature, scope and dynamics of this latter sense of administrative justice remain embryonic.
I hope this broader lens on administrative justice continues to come into focus, and that the
conversation about the interconnectedness of administrative justice continues to spark critique
and innovation by allowing us to see our own adjudicative bodies and political/legal cultures in a
new light.

*Professor Lorne Sossin is Dean Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada. This paper was the keynote address at the 2013 AIAL Australian National
Administrative Law Conference, Canberra, 18 July 2013.
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